Values and health risks: An editorial by Heyman, Bob et al.
University of Huddersfield Repository
Heyman, Bob, Alaszewski, Andy and Brown, Patrick
Values and health risks: An editorial
Original Citation
Heyman, Bob, Alaszewski, Andy and Brown, Patrick (2012) Values and health risks: An editorial. 
Health, Risk & Society, 14 (5). pp. 399-408. ISSN 1369-8575
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/14344/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
1 
 
VALUES AND HEALTH RISKS: AN EDITORIAL 
 
Bob Heymana, Andy Alaszewskib and Patrick Brownc 
 
 
aSchool of Human and Health Science, University of  Huddersfield, Huddersfield,  
UK, bCentre for Health Services Studies, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK and 
cDepartment of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 
the Netherlands 
 
Short title: Values and health risks 
 
Address for correspondence Bob Heyman Email b.heyman@hud.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This special issue is the second in a four-part series Health Care Through the ‘Lens 
of Risk’ which focus on risk categorisation, valuing, expecting and time-framing 
respectively, and published or to be published in 2012-2013. The present editorial 
introduces the issue of risk valuing in relation to an interview-based article and four 
substantial research papers. It will be argued that the notion of ‘adverse event’ 
projects negative value onto events themselves, directing attention away from the 
observer’s active judgemental role. The location of value judgements in the 
perspectives of social actors allows their potential variability to be more clearly 
recognised. This issue will be explored in the editorial which introduces papers 
concerned with hard drug consumption, self-hurting, the community rehabilitation of 
forensic mental health service users who have committed serious offences against 
other persons, the treatment of anal cancer and the perspectives of young pregnant 
women. The common theme linking these papers is the positive valuing of risk-taking 
officially designated as unacceptable.  
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VALUES AND HEALTH RISKS: AN EDITORIAL  
 
This editorial introduces the second of a series of four special issues, Health Care 
Through the ‘Lens of Risk’, which will be published in Health, Risk & Society over the 
next year. The series will focus on health risk-thinking, with its starting point the 
Royal Society Risk report (1992, p. 2) definition of risk as the probability (3) that a 
particular adverse (2) event (1) occurs during a stated period of time (4a), or results 
from a particular challenge (4b) (our numbering in brackets). The report framed this 
definition as the grounding  for quantitative risk assessment, portrayed as ‘a powerful 
tool for investigation and reduction of risk’. The ambition of measuring risks, viewed 
as if they were material entities possessing the objective properties of adversity, 
probability and temporal extension, would not be put forward with so much 
confidence today, 20 years after the report was published. The integral role of the 
observer in the construction of risks, as argued for in a later section of the Report 
itself (Pidgeon et al., 2002), is now widely recognised. Nevertheless, the Royal 
Society definition offers a good starting point for an interpretive deconstruction in 
which events are reframed as categories, adversity as negative value, probabilities 
as uncertain expectations and time periods as time frames (Heyman, Shaw, 
Alaszewski and Titterton, 2010). The present special issue, concerned with valuing, 
follows the first (Volume 14, number 2, 2012) which focussed on health risk 
categorisation.  
 
Although each of the four special issues in the present series will foreground one of 
the four elements folded into the Royal Society and other definitions, their 
interconnectedness ensures that one cannot be adequately conceptualised without 
consideration of the others. In relation to valuing, a contingency will only become a 
recognised risk if it involves outcomes which matter to the members of a particular 
social group. The chance of losing ball-point pens has received little research 
attention, except perhaps among their producers, despite its annoyingly high 
probability! Conversely, an outcome cannot be valued in the general terms of risk 
analysis unless a diversity of unique events have been homogenised into a single 
differentiated category such as child-abuse, terrorism or depression. Hence, risk 
construction and (negative) valuingi must occur conjointly, since only what is 
categorised can be valued as an abstract entity, while the trivial will not be marked 
out as worthy of consideration as risky. Social groups who think in terms of risk 
attempt to organise themselves around contested and shifting selections of possibly 
occurring unwanted events which are plucked from the infinity of contingency, i.e. 
from the boundless set of what might come to pass. 
 
Continuing with the theme of interrelationships between the four identified elements 
of the risk compound, even when probability calculations draw on experience, as 
when rates of health outcomes are observedii, the results will depend upon value-
driven, often implicit choices about what to look foriii, and about how to group the 
unlimited variability of nature into categories. In relation to the latter, probabilities 
calculated through induction from observed frequencies can only be applied to 
categories which specify what should and should not count as a case. In 
consequence, one way to protect a valued activity from the charge of irresponsible 
risk-taking is to differentiate safe and dangerous sub-categories. This socio-cognitive 
manoeuvre will be documented in the present special issue in relation to illicit drug 
consumption (Caiata-Zufferey, 2012) and self-hurting (Barton-Breck and Heyman, 
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2012). Similarly, choices about time-framing and time-discounting can be used to 
change the value of an outcome, for instance if the effectiveness of an intervention is 
only considered over a short period so that relapses occur beyond the observer-set 
temporal horizon. The UK smoking cessation programme which measured 
‘successful’ quitting over a four week time period (The NHS Information Centre, 
2008) provides a good example, as does attempts by the nuclear industry to set a 
500 year temporal horizon for considering the health cost of radioactive waste 
(Atherton and French, 1999).  
 
Valuing is the most ethereal of the four risk elements folded into the Royal Society 
definition quoted above. Categorisation and time-framing can sometimes be 
anchored to qualitative shifts such as the presence of a carcinoma or death, and 
probabilities can be grounded in induction from observed frequencies. However, 
values can only be located in perceivers, without whom events would merely 
happen. Some of the dauntingly complex issues which lurk concealed in the 
apparently ‘surprisingly simple’ process of everyday and formal cost-benefit analysis 
(Wolff, 2007) will be briefly outlined below in relation to the contributions of the 
included original papers. The editorial writers aim not to argue against utilitarian 
rationality, a quixotic and self-defeating endeavour since collective and individual 
healthcare decisions must be made somehow, but to counterpoint the apparent 
simplicity of this form of rationality against the many complexities which it glosses 
over. 
 
ADVERSE EVENTS VERSUS VALUING HEALTH RISKS 
 
In keeping with the predominantly objectivist proclivities of its senior authors, the 
Royal Society Risk report (1992, p. 3) defined ‘an adverse event’ as ‘an occurrence 
that produces harm’ as a result of ‘damage’, in turn rendered as ‘the loss of inherent 
quality suffered by an entity (physical and biological)’. Common biology combined 
with shared culture (but complicated by multiculturalism and value pluralities) ensure 
that social actors will often agree at least about what is and isn’t adverse, even if 
they differ as to the degree of adversity to be attached to a particular ‘event’ 
category. Nevertheless, as already argued, value arises in the observer, not in what 
happens. As Rescher (1983, p. 27, quoted author’s emphasis) put it, people 'ascribe 
values to negativities'. Shakespeare’s Hamlet made a similar point when he asserted 
that 'There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so' (Hamlet, Act II, 
Scene ii). In consequence, the same outcome category may be valued differently 
(Rosa, 2003). Both Rescher, writing about risk philosophy, and Shakespeare, 
speaking through his imagined character, felt that they were challenging common 
thinking which projects the observer’s values onto events, so that their perceived 
adversity is experienced as an inherent external property. As long as social actors 
share the same values, such epistemological distortions will matter little. However, 
they can result in conflict derived from the mystification of value divergences, as 
when parents who positively value the birth of a child with disabilities encounter 
health professionals who consider such births to be a self-evidently adverse events 
(Oulton and Heyman, 2009). Projection of values onto events serves the function of 
reducing value divergences, thereby facilitating the alignment of social groups, and 
shoring up prevailing social power structures, however temporarilyiv. 
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Recognising that valuing is an action gives rise to a whole set of issues which may 
be obscured by its projection onto events, starting with the question of what a person 
does when they value. At the minimum, valuing might be reduced to demonstrating a 
preference. In this sense, tropisms, simple electronic devices wired up to move 
towards light sources, might be said to ‘value’ light. This behavioural definition gives 
rise to the possibility that individuals or social groups do not understand their own 
values, as when employment practices (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010, p. 4) and 
matched guise experiments (e.g. Purkiss et al., 2006) reveal the collective negative 
value, in many developed societies, of non-standard race or ethnicity. Although 
demonstrated in what social actors actually do, most people, including the present 
authors, would reject this ‘value’ as repugnant if asked. As argued by Slovic (2012) 
in this special issue with respect to smoking, affect can shape behaviour outside 
conscious awareness, a ‘valuing’ process which stands in contrast to deliberative 
rational decision-making.  
 
The minimalist behavioural approach to valuing gives rise to at least two 
fundamental problems, briefly considered below: that of encompassing moral 
considerations; and that of taking into account multiple qualitatively distinctive 
consequences. 
 
The interplay of preferencing with moralising 
 
Calculation of expected value entails identifying a set of consequences for a possible 
action, multiplying the positive or negative value of each by its probability, and then 
summing these products. In the health domain such actions can take a huge variety 
of forms, e.g. health promotion, implementing a medical intervention, discharging a 
residential patient or removing a child from their family. (Some of the many issues 
associated with utility calculation will be briefly outlined in the next section.) It might 
be supposed that preferencing can be cleanly separated from moralising, as argued 
by Nord (1999, p. 18). 
 
Broadly speaking, the utility of a health state is the same as the “goodness” of it to 
the individuals who are in it. By goodness I thus mean the well-being or quality of 
life associated with the state. (Note that goodness in an ethical sense is not 
implied). 
 
The above description excludes a key ingredient of valuing, its penetration by moral 
judgement (Erikson and Doyle, 2003), which greatly complicates quantification. Any 
number of thought experiments can be devised to illustrate that excluding moral 
considerations leads to culturally absurd conclusions. For instance, since women live 
longer than men, ceteris paribus, a given medical intervention will generate more 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) if focused on them rather than on men. Since this 
case has not been made, it can be concluded that the hard calculation of net 
utilitarian benefit is being softened by the tacit application of implicit ethical 
principles. Nord (1999) tried to include distributive justice in his expected value 
equations. But once this consideration has been recognised, the question of trade-
offs between fairness and utility has to be addressed. For example, in relation to 
randomised controlled trials the ‘myth of equipoise’ (Fries and Krishnan, 2004) 
requires expected value equivalence between patients entered into the different 
arms of a study to be maintained. However, the long-term collective interest in 
5 
 
weeding out ineffective treatments leads to even the terminally ill being given 
placebos rather than medicines which offer their only hope of survival. The operation 
of mathematically sophisticated expected value equations requires the application of 
potentially contentious presuppositions, some involving delicate but unspoken moral 
judgements. Human valuing cannot be reduced to mere personal preferencing, as 
could be done for tropisms, without creating intuitive absurdities which arise from 
violations of tacit encultured moral considerations. 
 
The problem of multiple consequences 
 
The most important and difficult value issue for risk assessment and management 
derives from the inevitability of human actions having multiple incommensurable 
consequences. The notion of the ‘adverse event’ draws attention towards an 
apparent singularity, and away from the widening chains of causality which spread 
out from any health-relevant action. Risk factor-outcome linkages such as smoking-
lung cancer, cannabis-psychosis, obesity-diabetes themselves reflect tacit cultural 
work which foregrounds a single collectively selected consequence (Heyman, 2010, 
pp. 45-46). But blessings are almost invariably mixed, and most clouds have a silver 
lining. Even an overwhelmingly beneficial intervention such as immunisation must be 
weighed against a very small possible risk of brain damage. Conversely, the 
generally lethal habit of smoking can confer some emotional benefits and  contribute 
to  stress management (Graham, 1987), can be used for weight control, and has 
been linked to reduced risks of Alzheimer's disease (Lee, 1994) and endometrial 
carcinoma in postmenopausal women (Weiss, 1985)v. In general, official healthcare 
narratives tend to downplay such ambivalences, particularly when costs and benefits 
can be viewed as finely balanced, as in the cases of breast cancer screening, 
moderate alcohol consumption and sun exposurevi. 
 
The iron law of unintended consequences (‘Sod’s Law’ in the UK) almost guarantees 
that any major collective and/or individual healthcare intervention will have 
unanticipated unwanted effects. For instance, widespread use of pharmaceutical 
products has conferred huge health benefits, but also released a potentially 
significant cocktail of risky chemicals into rivers and drinking water (Houtmana, 
2010). Similarly, antibiotics have saved millions of lives, but their widespread and 
often inappropriate use in response to social, cultural and economic pressures (Jin et 
al., 2011) is creating super-resistant strains of bacteria, which, in some cases of 
tuberculosis, have become untreatable (Shelko, Van Wart and Francis, 2009). 
Research into the epigenetic effects of famine on pregnant women and their unborn 
children suggests that the latter are at greater risk of obesity and diabetes, and that 
this effect is transmitted over more than one generation (Godfrey et al., 2007). 
Hence, even specifying the consequence list is problematic. Peterson (2007, p. 74) 
argued that ‘there might be more than one way to construct a list of attributes for a 
given decision problem’. He also suggested that writers who recommend 
quantification of expected value across sets of qualitatively different consequences 
may be 'not aware of the problem’. Consequence lists tend to be produced on 
metaphorical backs of envelopes, and are inevitably encultured via the operation of 
affect, taste, habitus and intuition (Brown, 2012).  
 
Given that a consequence list has somehow been constructed, a daunting set of 
issues confronts anyone attempting to validly assess expected value (Heyman et al., 
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2010, pp. 66-76). On account of their incommensurability, consequences can only be 
summed through conversion to a common value currency. But any fuzziness in the 
conversion terms will allow an indefinite number of summative values for a decision 
to be generated. Peterson (2007, p. 81) concluded from consideration of just this one 
issue, that ‘our present theories of rationality are not sufficiently well-developed’.  
Decision-makers may simply not be able to guesstimate how they might feel about 
an unexperienced risked future health-related state such as being blind, requiring a 
permanent colostomy bag or caring for a child who has a severe disability. But 
healthcare decisions grounded in such value anticipations are frequently irreversible. 
The value which an individual places on a health outcome may change through 
experience which is itself dynamically affected by the consequences of risk 
management decisions. Living with a stoma provides a particularly clear example of 
both value fuzziness and dynamics which are difficult to anticipate at the time when 
choices must be committed to. Patients may, on average, overestimate the adversity 
of subsequently living with a permanent stoma (Bossema et al., 2007), and some of 
the early problems appear to be experienced as less adverse after a year of usage 
(Grumann et al., 2001). This analysis represents social actors as passive 
experiencers of value, but individuals may attempt to actively mitigate risks, as 
illustrated by Barton-Breck and Heyman (2012) in this volume, a possibility which 
renders static cost-benefit analyses more or less useless. 
 
Calculations of net expected utility are ‘directionless’ in terms of who gains and 
loses, but this issue is critical to the politics of risk decision-making, for example  
between those who will profit from pollution and those who will have to live with it. 
And the values of health outcomes may be dialectically affected by their probabilities 
and temporal characteristics. For instance, the multiplicative computation built into 
cost-benefit analysis relies on the dubious assumption that members of the public 
will equate a low probability/high adversity outcome with a high probability/low 
adversity one if their measured utilities are similar (Renn, 2008). Health economists 
may discount time at the long-run true financial interest rate (Viscusi, 1992), but the 
judgements of people confronting serious health problems can be much more 
complex. For example, patients with lung cancer have been found to prefer to avoid 
surgery which would increase their overall five year survival chances at the price of 
an immediate increased risk of death resulting from the operation (McNeil, 
Weichselbaum and Pauker, 1978). This finding, perhaps generalisable to other 
conditions, suggests that patients faced with a high risk of death may discount time 
at a particularly high average rate. 
 
As decisions must somehow be made, the calculation of expected value on the basis 
of available evidence may offer the best practical guide to collective and individual 
risk management decision-making. Where the ceteris paribus assumption can 
reasonably be made, e.g. in relation to two cancer treatments with different financial 
costs and efficacies but similar side-effects, such calculations can be undertaken 
with reasonable confidence. However, Sod’s Law guarantees that this simple 
template is rarely adequate. In the more usual and more complex cases, a becoming 
modesty, sometimes lacking in those who spawn ‘metrics’, is required. In such 
cases, ‘encoded’ best practice (Alaszewski, 2010) grounded in expert evidence and 
opinion must be viewed with a degree of caution.  
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THE PAPERS IN THIS SPECIAL ISSUE 
 
The present special issue offers an editorial on smoking and values, an interview-
based article considering the views of Joost van Loon and Ortwin Renn (Brown and 
Heyman  2012) on the social science of risk-thinking, and four original research 
papers concerned with the ways in which individuals make value judgements when 
confronting health risks. 
 
Slovic (2012) in his editorial draws upon an extensive body of research to challenge 
calculative models of young people’s decision-making about whether to take up 
smoking. He argues that many simply do not consider long-term risks, and are 
swayed by the iconography of shiny packaging and glamorous associations. 
Although the much derided ‘nanny state’ has proved remarkably successful in 
reducing the prevalence of this lethal habit in many developed societies, tobacco 
companies have found new markets in vulnerable poorer countries, and certain 
forms of tobacco advertising are currently allowed in the USA, as Slovic points out.  
 
The interviews with Ortwin Renn and Joost van Loon (Brown and Heyman, 2012) 
touch upon a range of salient themes pertaining to debates about values, amongst 
other aspects of risk. In focusing on the perceiving subject, certain social scientific 
approaches to risk have mapped out a range of value formats from a highly 
constructionist position. Though coming from somewhat different disciplinary 
backgrounds, both theorists seek to affirm a more realist ontology while recognising 
the important role of socially-embedded subjects. Van Loon, for example, develops 
the possibility of distinguishing between real and phantom risks from the starting 
point of conceptualising risks as virtualities.  
 
The four original research papers offer explorations of value issues in specific health 
risk domains. Caiata-Zuffrey’s (2012) analysis of drug-taking illustrates the 
interrelationship between risk categorisation and valuing. She interviewed ex-drug 
addicts who considered that they could safely use cocaine or heroin recreationally. In 
the paper, she analyses the socio-cognitive steps which respondents took to 
differentiate their actions from dangerous drug-abuse. Whether or not such 
distinctions are accepted in official circles, the risk management decision-making of 
those who think like her research participants cannot be understood outside this 
framework.  A similar differentiation of recreational and dangerous drug use has 
been noted in North-East England (Crawshaw and Bunton, 2009).  
 
Barton-Breck and Heyman (2012) consider the perspectives of individuals who have 
self-hurt as a way of coping with mental distress and who have never engaged with 
healthcare systems for this reason (as is the case with the majority of those who self-
hurt). The research shows that some individuals normalise self-hurting as equivalent 
to taking aspirin or a stiff drink, homogenising it with socially acceptable means for 
dealing with stress; and that most attempt to mitigate perceived risks of exposure, 
escalation and injury. However, some research participants experienced 
unanticipated longer term negative consequences. Emergent difficulties included: 
decline in the efficacy of self-hurting linked to a strengthening propensity towards 
escalation; existential isolation resulting from long-term concealment; and exhaustion 
from living with underlying emotional problems which self-hurting had allowed 
respondents to postpone dealing with. This paper thus documents some of the 
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issues outlined above: the role of ‘thinking’ in judgements about the value of 
apparent negativities such as severe physical pain; the importance of risk mitigation 
which allows decision-makers to attempt to actively change expected value; and the 
temporal dynamics that make the future value of  an action trajectories difficult or 
impossible to anticipate at the time when individuals become more or less committed 
to it. 
 
Coffey (2012) discusses the findings of a study in which he compared the 
perspectives of discharged forensic mental health service users and professionals 
charged with their care in the community. This issue has received little investigative 
attention as most research has been concerned with in-patient care or risk 
management in decision-making about discharging patients who have a history of 
offending. His research well illustrates the issues arising from multiple 
consequences, differences in value direction and value dynamics. Staff prioritised 
the risk of discharged patients reoffending. They implemented intensive monitoring 
processes in order to reduce the chance of members of the public being harmed. 
The subjects of monitoring were concerned primarily with the risk of their community 
integration being impeded by this very public prophylactic process. One perhaps  
Panglossian service provider argued that patients could benefit therapeutically by 
rising to the challenge of becoming locally accepted despite being overtly marked out 
as risky. 
 
Finally, Heyman et al. (2012) offer a single case study of a woman who received 
successful treatment for anal cancer. The paper explores the ways in which one 
individual can put together multiple risk and value considerations in their own 
personal way. The authors attempt to explain from their informant’s perspective why 
she metaphorically ‘risked exploding’ by ‘absconding’ to have sex with her boyfriend 
with stitches still in place immediately after undergoing major surgery. The paper 
shows how an action which seems irresponsibly and irrationally dangerous from a 
medical perspective can be understood in relation to the complex range of risked 
consequences over and above survival which trouble a particular person. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This special issue is concerned with the role of valuing in the perception and 
management of health risks. Adversity is always ascribed to, and never an intrinsic 
attribute of, events which are themselves constituted by culturally mediated 
categorisation processes. If it is accepted that values are always located in the 
‘thinking’ of social actors, it follows that the view of adversity as a property of events 
themselves must be underpinned by unreflective projection. Value externalisation is 
embedded in everyday reasoning which tends to be carried over into healthcare 
practice. This tacit socio-cognitive manoeuvre directs attention away from the 
possibilities of different value positions being adopted. It thereby helps to align 
organised social action, but only at the price of suppressing alternative views and 
inviting resistance.  
 
The papers presented in this special issue all challenge prevailing value schema in 
different ways. From the perspectives of social actors themselves, ‘hard’ drugs may 
be taken softly; self-hurting may be prescribed for mental health problems; the 
community integration of serious offenders against the person can be facilitated by 
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the curtailment of external monitoring; and personal relationship issues can appear 
as important as bodily health. Better understandings of such contrarian perspectives 
can facilitate improved communication with representatives of standard views. But 
doing so requires their subversive implications to be reflected on.     
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                            
i
 Its negativity has often been challenged, but in late modern societies designation as a risk requires at 
least one adverse contingency to be identified. The idea of positive risk-taking (Titterton, 2005) invites 
consideration of the counterbalancing benefits, but does not remove the core precautionary strand in 
risk-thinking. Invoking ‘risk’ requires prophylaxis to be at least considered. Linguistic choice of the 
term ‘danger’, in contrast, encodes the observer’s belief that a risk ought not to be taken (Heyman et 
al., 2010, pp. 25-27). 
ii
 Inductive probability estimation can only be attempted for high frequency events such as population 
mortality. Large data sets can usually be established for health risks. This approach cannot be applied 
to low frequency events such as nuclear accidents, although the rate of disasters is beginning to look 
suspiciously high. 
iii
 Notoriously, US General Tommy Franks claimed in 2002 that "We don't do body counts." (The 
Guardian Newspaper, 22nd October, 2010). This comment on civilian deaths during the second Iraq 
war has stuck in the public imagination, and offers a poster-child for value-driven risk selection. 
iv
 According to the historian Josephus Flavius, the Israelites of the first century AD were less than 
impressed by the Roman gift of games involving gladiatorial combat and human sacrifice (Eisen, 
1998, p. 494). It may appear obvious to neutral observers that members of one society view as an 
abomination activities which those with a different world-view consider to represent the height of 
civilisation. But such radical value divergences are not always so apparent to those who are 
immersed in a particular cultural conflict. 
v
 As discussed in this special issue (Slovic, 2012), tobacco companies attempt to attach positive 
value to smoking through shiny packaging and its representation as cool and sophisticated. In the UK 
at least, despite impressive advances in the public health fight against smoking, mass media vehicles 
such as BBC drama continue to portray the deliberate inhalation of tobacco smoke as a glamorous 
life-style choice. 
vi
 The first author was amused to read a recent UK newspaper article enjoining him to take the 
opportunity afforded by a rare break in the rain-clouds to absorb some mid-day sun. For many 
decades, he had been covering up, using high factor sun blocks and staying in the shade. 
Unfortunately for those who seek to promote simple health promotion messages, it is currently 
believed that sun exposure may both increase the risk of skin cancer and reduce the risk of multiple 
sclerosis. 
